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Abstract 
Technological progress has been shown to affect early retirement via two opposite forces. On 
the one hand, it increases real wages and, therefore, creates incentives to delay retirement. 
On the other hand, it causes an erosion of workers' skills, which raises the probability of early 
retirement. We reexamine the effect of technological progress on early retirement by taking 
into account that, at the beginning of their working life, individuals sort into sectors according 
to their ability level. This gives us two main results: 1) for small (large) technical changes the 
wage (erosion) effect dominates, and 2) the more able individuals resist better the erosion 
effect. 
 
Resum 
El progrés tecnològic afecta a la jubilació anticipada a través de dues forces oposades. Per una 
banda, augmenta el salari real i, per tant, crea incentius per posposar la jubilació. Per altra 
banda, causa l’erosió de les habilitats dels treballadors, el qual augmenta la probabilitat de 
jubilació anticipada. En aquest article reexaminem l’efecte del progrés tecnològic en la 
jubilació anticipada tenint en compte que, al principi de la vida laboral, els individus es 
distribueixen en diferents sectors segons la seva habilitat. Obtenim dos resultats principals: 1) 
per petits (grans) canvis tecnològics, l’efecte salari (erosió) domina, i 2) els individus més 
capaços resisteixen millor l’efecte erosió. 
 
JEL Codes: J24, J26, O15 y O33 
Keywords:  Early retirement, technological progress, ability sorting, sectoral sorting 
1 Introduction
Life expectancy in the US has risen to around 80 years for males and 83 years for females.
Moreover, above 70% of old age individuals feel in good health.1 Yet, the labor partici-
pation rate for individuals between 50 and 64 years old remains below 70% for males and
60% for females, and the percentage of employed people within this age range is 45% and
33%, respectively (see Figure 1). Hence, there is a non-negligible fraction of individuals
that stop working well before their formal retirement age. We refer to this phenomenon
as early retirement. Early retirement decisions influence the economic dependency ra-
tio of a country.2 Since policies aimed at decreasing the economic dependency ratio are
highly desirable in the context of an aging population, it is important to understand the
determinants of early retirement. In this paper we shed light on this issue.
The literature has highlighted several explanations for the evolution of early retirement
in the last decades (see Maestas and Zissimopoulos [2010] for a review). Some examples
are changes in the Social Security programs and pension plans (Crawford and Lilien
[1981], Blau [1994], Blundell et al. [2002], Rust and Phelan [1997], Ferreira and dos Santos
[2013]), changes in the age and skill composition of the labor force (Blau and Goodstein
[2010]), changes in leisure consumption choices (Kopecky [2011]), or the rise of the dual-
earner family and the tendency of couples to retire around the same time (Gustman and
Steinmeier [2000], Maestas [2001], Coile [2004]).
We focus on the effect of technological change on early retirement. Bartel and Sicher-
man [1993] and Ahituv and Zeira [2011] highlight how technological progress can con-
tribute to early retirement due to its erosion effect on individual’s skills. In particular,
Bartel and Sicherman [1993] find that workers in industries with high technological change
retire later than workers in industries with low technical change. They argue that indus-
tries that experience high technological change provide on-the-job training along the whole
working life, which incentivizes workers to retire later in order to recoup the returns on
their training. They also find that unexpected shocks in technology increase the proba-
bility of early retirement due to the consequent erosion effect. Ahituv and Zeira [2011],
1See OECD [2013].
2The economic dependency ratio is the share of the number of pensioners and unemployed relative to
the number of people in employment.
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instead, propose to estimate the erosion effect by distinguishing between aggregate and
sector-specific rates of technical change. According to their model, the former is respon-
sible for a general wage increase that might reduce early retirement, while the latter is
associated to the erosion effect. We reexamine the effect of technological progress on early
retirement by taking into account that individuals are heterogeneous at the beginning of
their working life and sort into sectors according to their ability level.
We build on the previous work of Ahituv and Zeira [2011] and show that early re-
tirement depends not only on the speed of technical change -the erosion and wage effects
already found in the previous literature- but also on its interaction with the skill level of
individuals -what we call the sorting effect-. We construct a simple model with ex-ante
heterogeneous agents that choose in which sector to work when young and whether to
retire early when old. The sectoral skill distribution in equilibrium is a product of the
technological level of the sectors. Individuals with a high skill level sort into sectors with
a relatively high productivity, while low-tech sectors attract low skill individuals. This
sorting implies that individuals in more productive sectors are also more able to retrain
and resist the erosion effect on their human capital exerted by the technical progress.
Hence, the model predicts that the probability of early retirement depends on the techni-
cal change in the sector where the individuals work but also on the technical level at the
time when individuals entered the labor market.
We employ our model to inform our empirical analysis. We use RAND Health and
Retirement Study (HRS) data,3 a survey that follows around 30000 adult individuals for
10 biannual waves between 1992 and 2010, with retrospective information on their job
history. We merge this data with BEA aggregate data on productivity levels and their
growth rates between 1948 and 2010. We find that 1) there exists sorting by skills across
sectors with different technical level, 2) the probability of early retirement depends on
whether the productivity growth in the sectors where the individuals work is relatively
high or low, and 3) the sorting effect matters to explain early retirement.
The policy implications of this study are two-fold. On the one hand, it predicts sectoral
differences in the response of older workers to technical change. On the other hand, it
3The RAND HRS Data file is an easy to use longitudinal data set based on the HRS data. It
was developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security
Administration. RAND [December 2011]
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suggests that the implications for retirement behaviors of retraining programs to favor
the permanence of the elderly in the labor force depend crucially on the skill composition
of the sector in which they work and on the pace of technical progress.
Our work is related to the literature that studies the effect of a growingly elderly labor
force on productivity. Sala-i Martin [1996] proposes a model where, due to a positive
externality in the average stock of human capital, it is socially optimal to encourage
retirement when the difference between the skill level of the young and that of the old is
large enough. This points to a reverse causality between early retirement and productivity.
For example, Meyer [2011] finds that firms with a younger workforce benefit from a larger
rate of technology adoption. There is also some evidence that the age composition of the
labor force has an aggregate effect on productivity (Feyrer [2007], Werding [2008]). Since
we consider technical changes that occur during the whole working life of individuals and,
thus, before the individual early retirement decisions, our results are arguably qualitatively
robust to this issue.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the set-up of the model.
In Section 3 we solve the model and derive its main implications. In Section 4 we test
empirically the implications of the model and compare our results with the previous
literature, namely, Ahituv and Zeira [2011]. Section 5 draws the final conclusions. All
proofs, figures, and tables are in the Appendix.
2 The model
We construct a small open economy on the basis of Ahituv and Zeira [2011]. On the pro-
duction side, a unique consumption good is produced using a continuum of intermediate
sectors. We normalize the mass of intermediate sectors to 1. The production Yt of the
consumption good at time t is the aggregation of sector-specific intermediate goods, that
is,
Yt =
∫ 1
0
Xitdi, (1)
where Xit is the output of sector i. Within each sector, a continuum of perfectly com-
petitive firms employs capital and efficiency units of labor to realize production Xit, that
is,
Xit = F (Kit, Hit) = Hitf(kit), (2)
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where Kit is the quantity of capital in sector i, Hit measures the efficiency units of labor
in sector i, kit ≡ Kit/Hit is the ratio of capital to efficiency units of labor, and the
function f is the intensive form of the real-valued function F , which is strictly increasing
and concave in both arguments, is homogeneous of degree one, and satisfies the Inada
conditions. Under perfect competition, each firm chooses the optimal level of capital and
efficiency units of labor in order to maximize profits, taking as given the price of capital
rit and the price per efficiency unit of labor wit. Thus, the inverse demand functions for
the two factors of production in sector i are
rit = f
′(kit) (3)
for capital and
wit = f(kit)− f ′(kit)kit, (4)
for efficiency units of labor. Both prices are functions of the ratio kit. We assume that the
world rental rate is constant at the level r¯. Since firms operate in a small open economy,
they can borrow and lend without restrictions in the international capital markets. Hence,
rit = r¯ for every i and for every t. As a consequence, the optimal ratio kit is constant at
kit = k¯ and therefore the price wit of the efficiency units of capital is fixed at wit = w¯ =
f(k¯)− f ′(k¯)k¯ for every i and for every t.4
The productivity -the efficiency units per unit of labor- in sector i at time t corresponds
to the technical level ait available in sector i at time t. This technical level evolves
according to
ait = ait−1bit,
where bit is the technical change in sector i. We assume that the technical change in every
sector is non-negative and bounded for every t, that is, 1 ≤ bit ≤ B. Sector i’s rate of
technical change is therefore ln(bi,t) = ln(ait)− ln(ait−1).
Assumption 1. The technical change is iid over time and across sectors with expectation
b > 0.
On the consumers side, each generation consists of a continuum of individuals of mass
1. Individuals live for two periods and are ex-ante heterogeneous in their inability to learn
4See Galor and Tsiddon [1997] for a similar framework.
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f , which is distributed over the support set [0, F ]. The lower f , the more able to learn
the individual. Each period lasts 1 unit of time. In the second period, however, there is
an amount Z of mandatory retirement, and only L = 1 − Z units of time are available
for working. Consider an individual born in period t − 1. In the first period of her life,
each individual observes her ability f and the distribution of technical levels across sectors
{ait−1}i, and decides the sector i where to work. Access to sector i requires a training time
ψ(ait−1, f). We will refer henceforth to ψ as the entry function, and we denote ψj and ψjj
the first and second partial derivatives with respect to argument j = 1, 2. The function ψ
is strictly increasing and convex in both arguments. The higher the technical level ait−1
of the sector and/or the inability f of the individual, the more time the individual of type
f that chooses to access sector i has to spend in training. We assume that ψ12 ≥ 0.5 Each
individual divides her time in the first period between training and working, so that her
supply of units of labor -her hours worked- in the first period is (1 − ψ(ait−1, f)). Each
individual then works and earns the wage income when young
W Yt−1 ≡ w¯ait−1(1− ψ(ait−1, f)), (5)
where w¯ is the constant price per efficiency unit of labor as defined above, ait−1 is the
efficiency units per hour worked -the technical level of the individual-, and (1−ψ(ait−1, f))
is the individual supply of hours. Moreover, the individual chooses the optimal amount
mt−1 of savings to pass to the second period. In the second period of life each individual
has to choose among two possibilities. She can either retrain to the new technical level ait
of her sector and work, or retire early, supply no units of labor, and earn no wage income.6
If she chooses to retrain and work, she supplies L−φ(bit, f) units of labor, where φ(bit, f)
is the time spent in updating her knowledge to the new productivity level. We will refer
henceforth to φ as the retraining function, and we denote φj and φjj the first and second
partial derivatives with respect to argument j = 1, 2. The function φ is strictly increasing
5The assumption ψ12 ≥ 0 means that the marginal cost of reaching each level of knowledge ait−1 is
non-decreasing with f . This assumption could be relaxed without changing significatively the results.
We introduce it to simplify the analysis.
6As in Ahituv and Zeira [2011], we could add the possibility for workers to work without retraining.
This option could be easily ruled out by a condition on the parameter space which ensures that even if
the least able individual works in the sector with the highest technical change, she prefers to retrain once
she decides to work. The loss of generality is minimal, so we neglect this option for simplicity.
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and convex in both arguments. Similarly to the entry function, we assume that φ12 ≥ 0.
The wage income when old is
W ot ≡ w¯ait [L− φ (bit, f)] , (6)
where the productivity of the labor supply is ait.
7
An individual of type f derives utility from consumption in the first and second pe-
riod, and from retirement if she retires early. Individuals have different preferences for
retirement. We assume that the preference h for early retirement is distributed over the
interval [0, H] where H ∈ R+, and that h is independent from the learning inability f .
Individuals know their type f from birth, and only their taste h for retirement remains
unknown until the second period of life.8 Hence, their ex-ante lifetime utility Ut−1(at−1, f)
does not depend on h but does depend on f . Individuals are perfectly rational and maxi-
mize their ex-ante lifetime utility based on their expectations in period t− 1. The utility
of an individual of type f that chooses to work in sector i is
Ut−1(ait−1, f) ≡ u(cyt−1) + E [u(cot ) + 1v(h)] , (7)
where cyt−1 is consumption when young, c
o
t is consumption when old, 1 is an indicator
function that takes value 1 = 1 if the individual retires early and 1 = 0 if she does
not, and E [·] is the expectation operator. We assume that the functions u and v are
linear. This simplifies the model considerably but maintains intact its main insights on
the sorting of individuals into different sectors and the probability of early retirement.
3 Equilibrium
At the beginning of her first period, an individual of type f chooses optimally the sector i
where to work and the level of savings mt−1. In the second period the individual chooses
between retraining and working, or retiring early without working. We solve first for
the second period problem. Given that the utility is assumed linear in consumption, the
7Note that if the individual decides to retrain, it must be that L− φ(bit, f) ≥ 0.
8The preference for early retirement is unknown in the first period because it may depend on health
status, family situation, and other issues difficult to predict when one is young. This assumption does
not affect the main results of the paper.
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problem can be written as
max{W ot + (1 + r¯)mt−1, (1 + r¯)mt−1 + h}. (8)
At the beginning of the second period, individuals observe their taste h for early retirement
and the technical change bit in the sector they selected the period before. An individual
decides to retire early if the utility from early retirement is higher than the utility from
working, that is, if her taste for retirement is higher than the wage when old W ot ,
h > W ot = w¯ait [L− φ (bit, f)] . (9)
Early retirement is more likely whenever obligatory retirement is large (small L) and
wage per efficiency unit of labor is low (small w¯). Moreover, early retirement depends
on the chosen sector in two ways. First, the probability of early retirement decreases
with the initial labor productivity ait−1.9 In this way, the choice of the sector in the first
period influences the early retirement. Second, the technical change bit has an ambiguous
effect on the probability of early retirement. On the one hand, a larger technical change
increases the productivity of the retrained worker (wage effect). On the other hand, the
worker devotes more time to retraining, reducing her labor supply in the second period
(erosion effect).10
Let us solve now for the first period problem. Given that the utility is linear in
consumption, the optimal choice for savings is indetermined and the problem boils down
to choosing the sector where to work. In the first period, each individual observes her type
f and the distribution of productivity across sectors {ait−1}i. The choice of the sector
depends on the wage when young W yt−1 and the expected wage when old Et−1 [W
o
t ]. If
Assumption 1 holds, then the choice of the sector does not depend on the future technical
9Recall that ait = ait−1bit.
10In contrast to Ahituv and Zeira (2011), the wage effect in our model is affected by the sector-
specific technical change. In Ahituv and Zeira [2011] the wage effect corresponds to the aggregate growth
rate of technology since all individuals are equal in the first period and wages equalize across sectors
through prices of intermediate goods. Consequently, they distinguish between aggregate and sector-
specific technical change to identify the wage and the erosion effect. In our case, intermediate goods are
perfect substitutes and individuals differ from the very first period. If individuals know their ability level
already in the first period, the distinction between aggregate and sector-specific technical change does
not help anymore in disentangling between the wage effect and the erosion effect.
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change bit but rather exclusively on ait−1. Hence, the utility Ut−1(ait−1, f) of an individual
of type f described in (7) depends on i only in terms of the initial level of productivity ait−1
of the sector that the individual chooses. Therefore, there will be a sorting of individuals
into sectors according to their ability level.
Let us order the sectors at t − 1 according to their technical level ait−1, so that if
ait−1 > ajt−1 then i > j. Maximizing the lifetime utility with respect to i is equivalent
to maximize the same lifetime utility with respect to {ait−1}i∈[0,1], that is, to choose the
technical level ait−1 in the set of available technologies at t−1 that maximizes the lifetime
utility. Thus, we can write the first period problem as
max
{ait−1}i∈[0,1]
W yt−1 −mt−1 + Et−1 [max{W ot + (1 + r¯)mt−1, (1 + r¯)mt−1 + h}] . (10)
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the technical level a∗it−1 of the
optimal sector for an individual i of type f is unique. Moreover, there exists a decreasing
function at−1(f) such that a∗it−1 = at−1(f) for every i and for every f .
This proposition states that each individual of type f chooses a unique sector i among
those whose technical levels are available at time t − 1. Moreover, individuals with high
skill choose relatively high-productivity sectors, and individuals with low skill choose
relatively low-productivity sectors. The function at−1(f) represents the sorting of different
individual types across sectors. Although all individuals of the same type choose the same
sector, this does not imply that all individuals working in the same sector have the same
skill level.11 Proposition 1 implies that sectors differ in their skill composition, that is,
high skill individuals are more likely in high productivity sectors and low skill individuals
are more likely in low productivity sectors.
Following Proposition 1, the wage when young in equilibrium is a function of the type
f , that is, (
W yt−1
)∗
= w¯at−1(f)(1− ψ(at−1(f), f)),
for every f . Moreover, the wage when old in equilibrium is
(W ot )
∗ = w¯bitat−1(f) [L− φ(bit, f)] ,
11This depends on the initial distribution of productivities across sectors, which is not necessarily a
continuous increasing function.
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which depends on both the type f but also on the productivity growth bit. According
to the condition for early retirement in (9), an individual of type f in sector i at time t
retires early if and only if
h > w¯bitat−1(f) [L− φ(bit, f)] , (11)
where h ∈ [0, H].
We can distinguish two main forces that drive the decision on early retirement. On
the one hand, the wage effect depends on the initial productivity level and the technical
change of the chosen sector, and increases the incentives of working further. On the other
hand, the erosion effect is determined by the retraining costs, and pushes individuals
to retire early. The retraining costs depend on the technical change of the sector and
the individual inability to learn. The decision of individuals of type f to go to a sector
with productivity at−1(f) introduces a sorting effect on top of the wage effect. In other
words, the strength of the wage effect depends on the sector choice and therefore on the
individual learning inability.
Condition (11) implies that if (W ot )
∗ > H the individual keeps working with probability
1. If instead (W ot )
∗ ∈ [0, H], then the probability Pit(f) of early retirement of an individual
of type f in sector i at time t is
Pit(f) = 1− (W
o
t )
∗
H
= 1− w¯bitat−1(f) [L− φ(bit, f)]
H
.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists a unique decreasing
function b¯(f) that satisfies
L− φ(b¯(f), f)− φ1(b¯(f), f)b¯(f) = 0, (12)
such that
i)
dPit(f)
dbit
< 0 if bit < b¯(f) and
ii)
dPit(f)
dbit
> 0 if bit > b¯(f).
For low rates of technical change, the wage effect dominates and the probability of early
retirement decreases with bit. In contrast, when technical change in the sector is large,
the erosion effect dominates and the probability of early retirement increases. Moreover,
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the threshold that distinguishes between small and large shocks depends on the inability
level of the individual. Less skilled individuals suffer a relatively larger erosion effect than
more skilled individuals.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then,
∂Pit(f)
∂f
> 0 for any bit.
The probability of early retirement increases with the individual inability to learn, so
those sectors that attracted more able individuals should experience less early retirement.
The negative effect of inability on early retirement is due to both the lower wages for less
able individuals and the more time needed to retrain in case of a technical change.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, there exists an  > 0 such that
i)
∂2Pit(f)
∂bit∂f
> 0 if bit ≤ b¯(f) +  and
ii)
∂2Pit(f)
∂bit∂f
has an ambiguous sign if bit > b¯(f) + ,
where b¯(f) satisfies (12).
The effect of a given technical change bit on early retirement is larger for less able
individuals as long as the shock is not too large. The ambiguous result for the case of
large rates of technical change occurs because more able individuals have a larger time
opportunity cost. They have to give up larger wages in order to retrain and this increases
their total retraining costs.
4 Data and Regression Analysis
We use the RAND HRS dataset, which consists of a national panel survey of individuals
collected for the study of retirement and health among the elderly in the United States.
The RAND HRS contains information about around 30000 individuals followed in 10
biennial waves from 1992 to 2010. We have information about the labor status matched
with personal characteristics and details on the job history of the respondents. We focus
on individuals who are between 50 and 64 and were in the labour force two years earlier.
Our sample covers more than 52000 observations of 14704 individuals. We then merge the
RAND HRS data with the aggregate data of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
The aggregate data reports value added and employment levels for different NAICS-code
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disaggregations of the sectoral composition of the US economy, spanning from 1948 to
2010. We aggregate the NAICS codes so as to reconstruct the US Census sectors used in
the RAND HRS dataset. In this way we obtain the individual productivity -measured as
value added per worker- in the sector where each individual decide to work and the change
in productivity occurred between the start and the end of the working life. We report
in the Appendix the details on how we merge the two datasets and the construction of
the productivity variable. The final result is a panel of 10 periods and 14704 individuals
distributed in 13 sectors.
The empirical strategy unfolds as follows. First, we document the sorting of workers of
different skill levels -measured as years of education- in sectors with different initial pro-
ductivity. Second, we regress the probability of not working in period t on 1) the change
in productivity occurred since each individual started working, ln bit, 2) the individual
(inverse of) skill level f , and 3) the interaction of the two. We control for personal char-
acteristics such as gender, age, race, experience,12 marital status, residence, and health
status. Moreover, we run both pooled regressions with time dummies to capture aggre-
gate conditions, and panel regressions with random effects. Third, we conduct the same
exercise but separately for those individuals who experienced large (small) productivity
shocks, where a large (small) productivity shock is defined as a growth rate of productivity
above (below) the median for each level of education. Fourth, we add robustness checks
regarding the sample size, different measures of productivity growth, and the identification
of aggregate and sector-specific shocks.
4.1 Individual sorting in different sectors
Proposition 1 predicts that individuals with high skills choose high productivity sectors,
while individuals with low skills choose low productivity sectors. In order to check whether
this sorting by abilities occurs, we compute the correlation between the productivity level
of sectors at entry and the education level of individuals. Table 3 reports this measure
for each wave and for the whole sample. We obtain a positive and significant overall
correlation of above 0.18, which suggests the sorting process occurs. Our model allows
also that within each sector there might be more skill groups, and that the likelihood of
12We define experience as the number of years that the individual spent working.
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finding the whole span of skills decreases with the technical level. Figure 2 shows that
the higher the entry productivity in the sector, the lower the probability of finding low-
education individuals in that sector. Figure 3 compares across time the sector averages
of the productivity at entry with the sector averages of education, which confirms the
intuition behind the sorting process. The higher the average productivity at entry, the
higher the average skill level, both across sectors and over time.13
4.2 Baseline regressions
We regress the probability Pit(f) of notworking for an individual of type f in sector i at
period t on 1) the growth rate (ait−ait−1)/ait−1 ≈ ln bit of productivity since the individual
started working, 2) the inability level f ≡ 17− e, where e is the years of education, and
its quadratic form, and 3) the interaction between the productivity growth rate and the
inability level. We first present the pooled regression in Table 4, with controls for personal
characteristics and time dummies. Second, we report the results for the panel regression
with random effects in Table 5.14 In both regressions we compare the model (first column)
without sorting effect, that is, without the interaction between inability and productivity
growth, with the model (second column) with sorting effect. Moreover, we present an
alternative model (third column) with additional controls. In particular we introduce
whether the spouse is working, the wealth status, and the possibility that the individual
has some pension plan from the current or previous job.15 Standard errors are clustered
at the sector-wave-inability level in the pooled regression, and at the sector-inability level
in the panel regression.
13There is one notable exception. The Finance/Insurance/Real Estate sector experienced an increase
in the average skill level over time associated with a decrease in the productivity level at entry. These
dynamics appear in the waves between 2002 and 2006. Considering that on average individuals inter-
viewed in those waves entered the labor market around 1970, this suggests that something peculiar must
have happened in the Finance/Insurance/Real Estate labor market in those years.
14In Table 16 we compare the marginal effects computed from a probit model with the coefficients
of the linear probability model. As results are very similar, we use the linear probability model unless
otherwise specified.
15We do not introduce these controls in all the analyses because, on the one hand, they reduce the
sample size by around 20% and, on the other hand, the main results are not qualitatively sensitive to
their inclusion.
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The effect of the productivity growth is negative for all the specifications (albeit in-
significant in some cases), implying that individuals in sectors with higher technological
change are on average less likely to retire early. As Bartel and Sicherman [1993] argue,
this result could be a consequence of these sectors providing more on-the-job training to
their workers, which incentivizes them to retire later. In terms of the distinction between
wage and erosion effects described in Ahituv and Zeira [2011], this result implies that the
wage effect slightly dominates the erosion effect. In other words, the wage increase due
to technological change compensates on average for the retraining costs. If we read these
results through the lens of Proposition 2, they suggest that on average the productivity
growth is low enough (bit < b¯(f)) to let the wage effect dominate. This is consistent with
the positive sign of the interaction term (see Proposition 4), which means that the higher
the inability level the larger the positive effect of productivity growth on early retirement.
The inability variable has the expected sign, although the quadratic form has a negative
coefficient and the overall sign is therefore negative for high levels of inability (less than
6 years of education).
We find that individuals delay the decision on retirement if the spouse still works, in
line with Baker and Benjamin [1999], Blau [1998] and Coile [2004], among other papers.
The effect of the wealth status confirms another channel of the early retirement decision.
The wealthier the individual, the higher the likelihood of retirement. Moreover, if an
individual has any pension plan from current or previous job, she is more likely to retire
early, as the opportunity cost of working is higher (see Blundell et al. [2002] for similar
results). We also find that a bad health status makes the individual more likely to retire
early as in Ferreira and dos Santos [2013] and French [2005], among others.
4.3 Large and small shocks
In order to test our model we have to distinguish individuals who receive large shocks
from individuals who receive small shocks. The model predicts a negative (positive)
coefficient of technical change when shocks are small (large). Moreover, the interaction
term is supposed to affect positively the likelihood of early retirement for small shocks.
We define large (small) shock as a level of bit which is above (below) the median of the
14
distribution of bit’s for each level of education.
16 In Table 6 we present the results for
the pooled regression with time dummies, while in Table 7 we present the results for the
panel regression with random effects.17 In the first column we report the results for the
overall sample, while in the second and third column we present the same exercise but
separately for the individuals affected by large shocks and individuals affected by small
shocks.
The large shocks have a positive effect on the probability of early retirement alone
and a negative effect through the interaction term. Hence, the erosion effect seems to
exceed the wage effect in the case of large shocks as predicted. Moreover, the negative
interaction occurs because a higher wage increases the opportunity cost of retraining
for more able individuals strongly enough to convince them to retire early. The small
shocks instead make the wage effect dominate, as the largely negative coefficient on the
productivity growth suggests. Nevertheless, for small shocks the interaction term has a
positive coefficient, as predicted in Proposition 4. In other words, a higher inability level
alleviates the negative wage effect, as the wage does not increase enough to justify the high
tranining costs that a low skill individual has to bear to keep working. The coefficient on
the interaction term for small shocks suggests that for high levels of inability (less than 6
years of education) individuals retire earlier because the shock is relatively large for them
and the erosion effect dominates.
4.4 Robustness checks
We conduct three robustness checks for the main empirical analysis of our model. First,
we perform the analysis for men only because the steady increasing participation rate of
women may contribute in unclear ways to the results. Second, we consider an alternative
measure of productivity growth. Third, we isolate sector-specific from aggregate produc-
tivity growth in order to compare our results to the ones in Ahituv and Zeira [2011]. For
each of these checks, we report the results for both the pooled and the panel random
16We try different thresholds for the definition of large shocks and the results hold for different inter-
mediate levels (from the 40th percentile to the 65th).
17Similarly to what we do for the baseline regressions, in Table 17 we report the marginal effects
computed from a probit model. As results are very similar to the linear probability model, we use the
latter hereinafter.
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effects regressions distinguishing between small and large productivity shocks.
Table 8 and Table 9 report the results for men only. Both qualitatively and quantita-
tively the exercises confirm the results in the full sample.
In Table 10 and Table 11 we use the productivity growth occurred in the five years
prior to the interview year instead of the growth since the year in which each individual
entered the labor market. We then divide between small and large shocks as before, but
using the median of the 5-year growth per inability type. This alternative measure of
productivity growth provides similar results.18
The distinction between sector-specific shocks and aggregate shocks allows for a com-
parison with Ahituv and Zeira [2011]. Table 12 and Table 14 compare the set-up of
Ahituv and Zeira [2011] (first column) with a set-up that includes also interaction terms
of both sector-specific and aggregate productivity growth with inability. According to
Ahituv and Zeira [2011], the effect of sector-specific shocks reveals the erosion effect while
the effect of aggregate shocks takes into account both erosion and wage effects. Hence,
the coefficient on sector-specific shocks should be positive while the coefficient on the ag-
gregate shocks could have any sign. In the original paper, the growth rates are computed
only over the five years prior to the interview date, so that there cannot be any variation
in growth rates among individuals that work in the same sector. Hence, the measure
of aggregate growth is perfectly collinear with the time dummies, which are used as a
proxy of aggregate growth. Our measure of productivity growth instead accomodates for
different years of entry in the labor market, so that there is variation across individuals
within the same sector. Hence, we can separate time dummies and aggregate growth
rates in our regression. Our exercise in the first column of Table 12 and Table 14 yields a
largely negative effect of aggregate growth on the probability of early retirement, which
suggests that the wage effect is quantitatively more important than the erosion effect.
More importantly, we obtain a positive coefficient of the sector-specific technical change,
which implies an erosion effect of productivity growth as in Ahituv and Zeira [2011]. The
inclusion of interaction terms does not alter these results. In Table 13 and Table 15 we
check whether the results of Ahituv and Zeira [2011] hold separately for large and small
shocks. For large shocks the effect of a sector-specific shock is positive and the effect of
18The differences in magnitude of the coefficients are partly due to different scales in the growth rates.
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an aggregate shock is negative, as in the original set-up. Nevertheless, for small shocks
the effect of a sector-specific shock is negative, contrary to what Ahituv and Zeira [2011]
predict and in accordance to what our model delivers.
5 Conclusion
We explore the role of technical change on early retirement decisions. Our contribution
departs from previous literature in assuming initially heterogeneous individuals in terms
of their (in)ability to learn. This assumption has important implications for the explana-
tion of how technical change affects early retirement. Our model predicts that workers in
sectors with an initially high productivity level are more able and can resist larger erosion
of productivity shocks than workers in sectors with initially low productivity levels. More-
over, when productivity shocks are small, the increase in wage (wage effect) dominates
the increase in the cost of retraining (erosion effect). Thus, the probability of retirement
depends negatively on these shocks. In contrast, when productivity shocks are large, the
erosion effect dominates and individuals are more likely to retire early.
Although the trend for early retirement has been decreasing in the last two decades,
it is still very common in the US and most OECD countries. Further research could
explore the role of different technological paces on the trend in early retirement, taking
into account the different effects of small and large productivity shocks found in this
paper.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the problem in (10). The First Order Condition (FOC)
of this problem is
ψ(a∗it−1, f) + ψ1(a
∗
it−1, f)a
∗
it−1 − 1− E [bit (L− φ(bit, f))] = 0,
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for each f .19 By the implicit function theorem we obtain that
∂at−1(f)
∂f
= −ψ2(ait−1, f) + ψ12(ait−1, f)ait−1 + E [bitφ2(bit, f)]
2ψ1(ait−1, f) + ψ11(ait−1, f)ait−1
,
which is negative under the assumption that ψ is increasing and convex in both arguments
and ψ12 ≥ 0.20
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider first the derivative of Pit(f) with respect to bit, that is,
∂Pit(f)
∂bit
= −w¯at−1(f)
H
(L− φ(bit, f)− φ1(bit, f)bit) .
Since the retraining function φ is strictly increasing and convex, Φ(bit, f) ≡ L−φ(bit, f)−
φ1(bit, f)bit is positive for any bit < b¯(f), where b¯(f) satisfies Φ(b¯, f) = 0, and negative for
any bit > b¯(f). Hence,
∂Pit(f)
∂bit
< 0 if bit < b¯(f),
and
∂Pit(f)
∂bit
≥ 0 if bit ≥ b¯(f).
Moreover, since Φ(bit, f) is decreasing in f because φ2 > 0 and φ12 ≥ 0, b¯(f) is also
decreasing in f .
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider the derivative of Pit(f) with respect to f , that is,
∂Pit(f)
∂f
= −w¯bit
H
[
∂at−1(f)
∂f
(L− φ(bit, f))− at−1(f)φ2(bit, f)
]
.
Since the function at−1(f) is decreasing in f by Proposition 1, we have that
∂Pit(f)
∂f
> 0
for any bit.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the cross derivative of Pit(f) with respect to bit and f ,
that is,
∂2Pit(f)
∂bit∂f
= − w¯
H
[
∂at−1(f)
∂f
Φ(bit, f) + at−1(f)Φ2(bit, f)
]
,
19To be precise, we call at−1(f) the solution of (10) if the feasible set were R+. Given that
{ait−1}i∈[0,1] ⊆ R+, the actual solution a∗it−1 is simply the closest element in {ait−1}i∈[0,1] to at−1(f), for
every f . In case of two such elements in {ait−1}i∈[0,1], suppose we take the lowest of the two.
20Again, to be precise the approximate mapping between a∗it−1 and at−1(f) implies that if f > f
′
where a∗it−1 = at−1(f) and a
∗
jt−1 = at−1(f
′), then a∗it−1 ≤ a∗jt−1.
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where Φ(bit, f) is defined as above. The cross derivative is positive if
∂at−1(f)
∂f
Φ(bit, f) < −at−1(f)Φ2(bit, f).
Since Φ2(bit, f) = −φ2(bit, f) − φ12(bit, f)bit < 0, the right-hand side of the inequality is
always positive. Moreover, the left-hand side is non-positive for any bit ≤ b¯(f) since then
Φ ≥ 0. Therefore, the inequality is satisfied whenever bit ≥ b¯(f).
Moreover, the left hand side is increasing in bit. Therefore, there exists some  > 0
such that the inequality is satisfied for values of bit < b¯(f) + . For larger values of bit
results are ambiguous.
To sum up,
∂2Pit(f)
∂bit∂f
> 0 if bit < b¯(f) +  for some  > 0, and
∂2Pit(f)
∂bit∂f
has an
ambiguous sign otherwise.
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B Appendix: Data
We merge RAND HRS and BEA data in the following way. From the RAND HRS, we
know in which sector each individual worked most of her working life, and how many
years she spent working. We then substract this duration from the year in which she
stops working and compute in which year the respondent entered the labor market. From
the BEA data, we compute the value added per worker in each sector and year and
use this ratio as our measure of productivity. We then associate to each individual the
productivity when they entered the labor market and the productivity when they stopped
working for the sector where they spent most of their working life.21 In this way we have
the initial productivity ait−1 in the sector i where individuals decided to start working
and we can compute also the growth rate
ait − ait−1
ait−1
≈ ln bit of productivity from the
year they started working to the year they stopped. The aggregation of sectors is done
as indicated in Table 1. For the comparison with Ahituv and Zeira [2011], we compute
aggregate productivity growth as the average across sectors for each time span. Then,
we obtain the sector-specific productivity growth by substracting the aggregate from the
sectoral productivity growth defined above.
21There are individuals who migrate between sectors across time but we assign them the sector where
they spent most of their working life. In any case, their number is negligible (less than 5% of the sample).
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Figure 1: Data from OECD.Stat. Data refers to individuals aged 55-64 in the US.
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Figure 2: Individual sorting. Sources: RAND HRS and BEA. Each data point is an
individual. On the vertical axis we have the years of education from the RAND HRS
data. For illustrative purposes, we focus on the 2006 wave. On the horizontal axis we
report the productivity -value added per worker from the BEA data- of the sector where
individuals work computed at the time when individuals entered the labor market. The
graph does not change significantly for other waves.
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Figure 3: Average sorting across sectors and time. Sources: RAND HRS and BEA. Each
data point represents a sector-wave pair. On the vertical axis we show the average years
of education of individuals that work in a given sector as reported in a certain wave of
the RAND HRS data. On the horizontal axis we have the productivity -value added per
worker from the BEA data- of the sector where individuals work computed at the time
when individuals entered the labor market, and averaged across all individuals in the
same sector and wave. Different colors refer to different sectors. Different data points
of the same color represent different waves for the same sector. The curved and colored
lines represent polynomial fits within sectors. The solid black line is a linear regression
across all data points. Agric/Forest/Fish (1) is brown, Mining and Constr (2) is blue,
Mnfg: Non-durable (3) is green, Mnfg: Durable (4) is yellow, Transportation (5) is navy,
Wholesale (6) is purple, Retail (7) is cyan, Finan/Ins/RealEst (8) is red, Busns/Repair
Svcs (9) is magenta, Personal Services (10) is gray, Entertn/Recreatn (11) is orange,
Prof/Related Svcs (12) is maroon, and Public Administration (13) is lime. We report the
correspondance between HRS/Census codes and BEA codes in Table 1.
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Table 1: Sectoral aggregation
HRS sector NAICS codes
01.Agric/Forest/Fish 11
02.Mining and Constr 21, 22, 23
03.Mnfg: Non-durable 31, 32 (except 321 and 327), 51
04.Mnfg: Durable 33, 321, 327
05.Transportation 48, 49 (except 491)
06.Wholesale 42
07.Retail 44, 45
08.Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 52, 53
09.Busns/Repair Svcs 55, 56
10.Personal Services 6, 72
11.Entertn/Recreatn 71
12.Prof/Related Svcs 54
13.Public Administration NA (includes 491)
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Not-Working 0.234 0.423 0 1 52310
Productivity growth 0.837 1.103 -0.199 5.096 52310
Inability 4.147 2.947 0 17 52310
Experience 32.475 10.359 0 51 52310
Dummy for Male 0.443 0.497 0 1 52310
Age 57.217 3.836 50 64 52310
Age squared 3288.485 438.962 2500 4096 52310
African-American 0.157 0.363 0 1 52310
Hispanic 0.081 0.273 0 1 52310
Foreign-born 0.101 0.301 0 1 52310
Married 0.738 0.44 0 1 52310
Region: Midwest 0.253 0.435 0 1 52310
Region: South 0.41 0.492 0 1 52310
Region: West 0.169 0.375 0 1 52310
Bad health 2.546 1.092 1 5 52310
Year 1994 0.123 0.328 0 1 52310
Year 1996 0.115 0.318 0 1 52310
Year 1998 0.129 0.335 0 1 52310
Year 2000 0.107 0.309 0 1 52310
Year 2002 0.089 0.284 0 1 52310
Year 2004 0.106 0.308 0 1 52310
Year 2006 0.079 0.269 0 1 52310
Year 2008 0.065 0.247 0 1 52310
Year 2010 0.05 0.219 0 1 52310
Spouse working 0.455 0.498 0 1 50837
Net Wealth 275242.946 397996.731 -29700 3034308.75 51330
Pension 0.649 0.477 0 1 42488
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Table 3: Pair-wise correlation between productivity at entry and years of education
Variables Education: Years of Education
Productivity of sector at entry (All waves) 0.183***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 1) 0.167***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 2) 0.179***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 3) 0.179***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 4) 0.181***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 5) 0.182***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 6) 0.183***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 7) 0.171***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 8) 0.183***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 9) 0.179***
Productivity of sector at entry (Wave 10) 0.158***
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Table 4: Baseline regression: Pooled
No sorting Baseline Extended
Productivity growth -0.001 (0.002) -0.005 (0.003) -0.008*** (0.002)
Inability 0.011*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.003** (0.001)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000*** (0.000)
Growth*Inability 0.001 (0.001) 0.001*** (0.000)
Experience -0.009*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.002*** (0.000)
Male 0.012*** (0.004) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.026*** (0.003)
Age -0.280*** (0.014) -0.280*** (0.014) -0.234*** (0.012)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.006) 0.002 (0.004)
Hispanic -0.031*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.007) -0.003 (0.005)
Foreign-born -0.055*** (0.006) -0.055*** (0.006) -0.024*** (0.004)
Married 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004) 0.015*** (0.004)
Region: Midwest -0.005 (0.005) -0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.004)
Region: South 0.011** (0.005) 0.011** (0.005) -0.002 (0.003)
Region: West 0.024*** (0.006) 0.024*** (0.006) 0.004 (0.004)
Bad health 0.081*** (0.002) 0.081*** (0.002) 0.023*** (0.002)
Year 1994 0.025*** (0.009) 0.025*** (0.009) 0.041*** (0.004)
Year 1996 0.068*** (0.011) 0.068*** (0.011) 0.056*** (0.006)
Year 1998 0.043*** (0.009) 0.043*** (0.009) 0.043*** (0.006)
Year 2000 0.042*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.005)
Year 2002 0.089*** (0.010) 0.089*** (0.010) 0.047*** (0.008)
Year 2004 0.056*** (0.008) 0.056*** (0.008) 0.031*** (0.006)
Year 2006 0.051*** (0.009) 0.052*** (0.009) 0.028*** (0.007)
Year 2008 0.050*** (0.010) 0.050*** (0.010) 0.013** (0.007)
Year 2010 0.060*** (0.013) 0.060*** (0.013) 0.009 (0.009)
Spouse working -0.046*** (0.003)
Wealth 0.000*** (0.000)
Pension 0.094*** (0.003)
Constant 7.424*** (0.394) 7.420*** (0.394) 6.197*** (0.322)
Adj.R-squared 0.171 0.171 0.135
Observations 52310 52310 40562
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Baseline regression: Panel Random Effects
No sorting Baseline Extended
Productivity growth -0.006* (0.003) -0.014*** (0.005) -0.015*** (0.004)
Inability 0.014*** (0.003) 0.013*** (0.004) 0.004 (0.003)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000)
Growth*Inability 0.002* (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001)
Experience -0.011*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.000) -0.004*** (0.000)
Male 0.019** (0.009) 0.019** (0.009) 0.047*** (0.008)
Age -0.237*** (0.017) -0.237*** (0.017) -0.206*** (0.013)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.010 (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) 0.002 (0.007)
Hispanic -0.027** (0.011) -0.027** (0.011) -0.006 (0.008)
Foreign-born -0.070*** (0.009) -0.070*** (0.009) -0.040*** (0.007)
Married 0.004 (0.006) 0.004 (0.006) 0.015** (0.007)
Region: Midwest -0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.009) 0.002 (0.007)
Region: South 0.025*** (0.009) 0.025*** (0.009) 0.007 (0.005)
Region: West 0.035*** (0.010) 0.035*** (0.010) 0.009 (0.008)
Bad health 0.065*** (0.003) 0.065*** (0.003) 0.017*** (0.002)
Spouse working -0.050*** (0.006)
Wealth 0.000*** (0.000)
Pension 0.081*** (0.005)
Constant 6.132*** (0.479) 6.127*** (0.480) 5.427*** (0.366)
R-squared-within 0.147 0.147 0.122
R-squared-between 0.203 0.203 0.183
R-squared-overall 0.163 0.163 0.122
Observations 52310 52310 40562
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Large and small shocks: Pooled
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Productivity growth -0.005 (0.003) 0.012*** (0.004) -0.299*** (0.094)
Inability 0.011*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Growth*Inability 0.001 (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.027** (0.012)
Experience -0.009*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000)
Male 0.013*** (0.004) 0.012** (0.006) 0.008 (0.007)
Age -0.280*** (0.014) -0.277*** (0.020) -0.285*** (0.018)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.002 (0.006) 0.017** (0.007) -0.014* (0.008)
Hispanic -0.031*** (0.007) -0.009 (0.011) -0.056*** (0.010)
Foreign-born -0.055*** (0.006) -0.056*** (0.008) -0.052*** (0.010)
Married 0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) 0.007 (0.006)
Region: Midwest -0.005 (0.005) -0.002 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008)
Region: South 0.011** (0.005) 0.001 (0.007) 0.019*** (0.007)
Region: West 0.024*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.023*** (0.009)
Bad health 0.081*** (0.002) 0.078*** (0.003) 0.084*** (0.003)
Year 1994 0.025*** (0.009) 0.010 (0.011) 0.033** (0.014)
Year 1996 0.068*** (0.011) 0.055*** (0.015) 0.075*** (0.018)
Year 1998 0.043*** (0.009) 0.024* (0.013) 0.068*** (0.014)
Year 2000 0.042*** (0.010) 0.031** (0.014) 0.056*** (0.013)
Year 2002 0.089*** (0.010) 0.058*** (0.016) 0.134*** (0.020)
Year 2004 0.056*** (0.008) 0.036*** (0.012) 0.097*** (0.016)
Year 2006 0.052*** (0.009) 0.029** (0.013) 0.102*** (0.016)
Year 2008 0.050*** (0.010) 0.031** (0.014) 0.098*** (0.019)
Year 2010 0.060*** (0.013) 0.040** (0.018) 0.116*** (0.023)
Constant 7.420*** (0.394) 7.321*** (0.559) 7.585*** (0.523)
Adj.R-squared 0.171 0.149 0.196
Observations 52310 27452 24858
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Large and small shocks: Panel Random Effects
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Productivity growth -0.014*** (0.005) 0.005 (0.007) -0.326*** (0.105)
Inability 0.013*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006) 0.009** (0.004)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000)
Growth*Inability 0.002* (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.025** (0.012)
Experience -0.011*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.000)
Male 0.019** (0.009) 0.022** (0.010) 0.006 (0.014)
Age -0.237*** (0.017) -0.250*** (0.023) -0.236*** (0.017)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.009 (0.010) 0.022* (0.012) -0.001 (0.012)
Hispanic -0.027** (0.011) -0.010 (0.015) -0.043*** (0.016)
Foreign-born -0.070*** (0.009) -0.069*** (0.012) -0.066*** (0.015)
Married 0.004 (0.006) 0.004 (0.009) 0.004 (0.008)
Region: Midwest -0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.010) -0.003 (0.013)
Region: South 0.025*** (0.009) 0.010 (0.010) 0.039*** (0.012)
Region: West 0.035*** (0.010) 0.032** (0.013) 0.038** (0.015)
Bad health 0.065*** (0.003) 0.064*** (0.004) 0.069*** (0.003)
Constant 6.127*** (0.480) 6.442*** (0.650) 6.064*** (0.467)
R-squared-within 0.147 0.154 0.154
R-squared-between 0.203 0.156 0.221
R-squared-overall 0.163 0.144 0.184
Observations 52310 27452 24858
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Robustness: Only men (pooled)
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Productivity growth 0.001 (0.004) 0.007 (0.005) -0.162* (0.089)
Inability 0.014*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.004) 0.011*** (0.004)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000)
Growth*Inability -0.000 (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) 0.007 (0.012)
Experience -0.010*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.001) -0.010*** (0.001)
Age -0.284*** (0.022) -0.302*** (0.028) -0.252*** (0.032)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.004 (0.008) 0.012 (0.011) -0.006 (0.012)
Hispanic -0.034*** (0.011) -0.012 (0.014) -0.066*** (0.015)
Foreign-born -0.085*** (0.009) -0.090*** (0.011) -0.080*** (0.014)
Married -0.057*** (0.007) -0.052*** (0.009) -0.066*** (0.012)
Region: Midwest -0.012 (0.008) -0.005 (0.010) -0.027** (0.013)
Region: South -0.005 (0.007) -0.008 (0.009) 0.001 (0.011)
Region: West 0.002 (0.008) 0.001 (0.010) 0.004 (0.015)
Bad health 0.080*** (0.003) 0.078*** (0.004) 0.083*** (0.004)
Year 1994 0.024*** (0.009) 0.015 (0.012) 0.035** (0.016)
Year 1996 0.048*** (0.011) 0.048*** (0.016) 0.043** (0.018)
Year 1998 0.030*** (0.011) 0.020 (0.014) 0.046*** (0.016)
Year 2000 0.021* (0.012) 0.027* (0.016) 0.010 (0.016)
Year 2002 0.074*** (0.013) 0.052*** (0.019) 0.113*** (0.022)
Year 2004 0.032*** (0.011) 0.029** (0.014) 0.040** (0.016)
Year 2006 0.021* (0.012) 0.007 (0.015) 0.063*** (0.022)
Year 2008 0.034** (0.015) 0.033* (0.018) 0.041 (0.029)
Year 2010 0.026 (0.019) 0.018 (0.026) 0.047** (0.024)
Constant 7.619*** (0.620) 8.082*** (0.807) 6.746*** (0.899)
Adj.R-squared 0.172 0.159 0.197
Observations 23197 14739 8458
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Robustness: Only men (panel RE)
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Productivity growth -0.008 (0.006) 0.001 (0.009) -0.289** (0.116)
Inability 0.018*** (0.005) 0.025*** (0.008) 0.017*** (0.006)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.001)
Growth*Inability 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.018 (0.013)
Experience -0.013*** (0.001) -0.013*** (0.001) -0.011*** (0.001)
Age -0.244*** (0.026) -0.270*** (0.030) -0.211*** (0.031)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.006 (0.013) 0.012 (0.018) 0.007 (0.018)
Hispanic -0.033* (0.018) -0.013 (0.020) -0.067*** (0.024)
Foreign-born -0.104*** (0.012) -0.111*** (0.015) -0.095*** (0.017)
Married -0.050*** (0.009) -0.044*** (0.011) -0.062*** (0.014)
Region: Midwest -0.009 (0.013) -0.000 (0.013) -0.025 (0.021)
Region: South 0.005 (0.011) -0.000 (0.014) 0.013 (0.018)
Region: West 0.009 (0.012) 0.012 (0.013) 0.007 (0.023)
Bad health 0.065*** (0.003) 0.065*** (0.004) 0.067*** (0.004)
Constant 6.403*** (0.739) 7.103*** (0.851) 5.479*** (0.865)
R-squared-within 0.160 0.170 0.152
R-squared-between 0.206 0.172 0.235
R-squared-overall 0.167 0.155 0.190
Observations 23197 14739 8458
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 10: Robustness: 5-year productivity growth (pooled)
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Growth (5y) -0.137*** (0.043) 0.061 (0.064) -0.416* (0.236)
Inability 0.012*** (0.002) 0.032*** (0.006) -0.000 (0.005)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Growth (5y)*Inability 0.003 (0.007) -0.059*** (0.012) 0.095*** (0.030)
Experience -0.009*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000)
Male 0.015*** (0.004) 0.025*** (0.006) -0.003 (0.009)
Age -0.285*** (0.013) -0.298*** (0.018) -0.264*** (0.020)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008)
Hispanic -0.031*** (0.007) -0.017 (0.010) -0.043*** (0.011)
Foreign-born -0.054*** (0.006) -0.046*** (0.008) -0.062*** (0.010)
Married 0.002 (0.004) -0.008 (0.005) 0.014** (0.006)
Region: Midwest -0.001 (0.005) 0.003 (0.007) -0.009 (0.008)
Region: South 0.011** (0.005) 0.005 (0.006) 0.015* (0.008)
Region: West 0.024*** (0.006) 0.032*** (0.008) 0.014 (0.009)
Bad health 0.081*** (0.002) 0.076*** (0.003) 0.085*** (0.003)
Year 1994 0.022** (0.009) 0.067*** (0.013) -0.029 (0.028)
Year 1996 0.063*** (0.011) 0.125*** (0.016) 0.003 (0.029)
Year 1998 0.038*** (0.010) 0.071** (0.030) 0.025 (0.038)
Year 2000 0.040*** (0.010) 0.067*** (0.022) 0.045 (0.032)
Year 2002 0.085*** (0.011) 0.107*** (0.019) 0.112*** (0.034)
Year 2004 0.051*** (0.009) 0.091*** (0.018) 0.042 (0.041)
Year 2006 0.045*** (0.010) 0.143*** (0.023) -0.046 (0.031)
Year 2008 0.037*** (0.010) 0.172*** (0.027) -0.055* (0.029)
Year 2010 0.051*** (0.013) 0.220*** (0.033) -0.047 (0.029)
Constant 7.571*** (0.379) 7.866*** (0.511) 7.009*** (0.572)
Adj.R-squared 0.170 0.174 0.184
Observations 54384 29611 24773
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 11: Robustness: 5-year productivity growth (panel RE)
All shocks Large shocks Small shocks
Growth (5y) -0.159*** (0.057) 0.053 (0.055) -0.895*** (0.284)
Inability 0.014*** (0.003) 0.020*** (0.006) 0.008 (0.005)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Growth (5y)*Inability 0.004 (0.009) -0.028*** (0.010) 0.121*** (0.038)
Experience -0.011*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000) -0.011*** (0.001)
Male 0.022** (0.009) 0.019* (0.012) 0.013 (0.012)
Age -0.244*** (0.016) -0.266*** (0.020) -0.249*** (0.023)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
African-American 0.011 (0.009) 0.008 (0.012) 0.006 (0.010)
Hispanic -0.027** (0.011) -0.010 (0.015) -0.046*** (0.013)
Foreign-born -0.069*** (0.009) -0.050*** (0.011) -0.069*** (0.014)
Married 0.003 (0.006) -0.008 (0.008) 0.012 (0.008)
Region: Midwest 0.002 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) -0.007 (0.014)
Region: South 0.025*** (0.009) 0.017* (0.009) 0.023** (0.011)
Region: West 0.036*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.009) 0.017 (0.015)
Bad health 0.064*** (0.003) 0.066*** (0.003) 0.066*** (0.003)
Constant 6.328*** (0.454) 6.895*** (0.558) 6.506*** (0.638)
R-squared-within 0.147 0.153 0.134
R-squared-between 0.200 0.172 0.191
R-squared-overall 0.163 0.158 0.171
Observations 54384 29611 24773
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
36
Table 12: Robustness: Net and aggregate productivity growth I (pooled)
No sorting Sorting
Net growth 0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.003)
Aggregate growth -0.727*** (0.021) -0.714*** (0.023)
Inability 0.015*** (0.002) 0.019*** (0.003)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Net growth*Inability 0.001** (0.001)
Aggr growth*Inability -0.003* (0.002)
Male 0.018*** (0.004) 0.018*** (0.004)
Age -0.298*** (0.013) -0.298*** (0.013)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
Experience 0.014*** (0.001) 0.014*** (0.001)
African-American -0.005 (0.005) -0.006 (0.005)
Hispanic -0.029*** (0.007) -0.030*** (0.007)
Foreign-born -0.053*** (0.006) -0.052*** (0.006)
Married 0.003 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)
Region: Midwest -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.005)
Region: South 0.010* (0.005) 0.009* (0.005)
Region: West 0.028*** (0.006) 0.027*** (0.006)
Bad health 0.077*** (0.002) 0.077*** (0.002)
Year 1994 0.028*** (0.009) 0.028*** (0.009)
Year 1996 0.042*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.011)
Year 1998 0.054*** (0.009) 0.054*** (0.009)
Year 2000 0.092*** (0.010) 0.093*** (0.010)
Year 2002 0.158*** (0.010) 0.158*** (0.010)
Year 2004 0.203*** (0.009) 0.204*** (0.009)
Year 2006 0.198*** (0.009) 0.198*** (0.009)
Year 2008 0.182*** (0.010) 0.182*** (0.010)
Year 2010 0.234*** (0.012) 0.234*** (0.013)
Constant 7.633*** (0.372) 7.632*** (0.372)
Adj.R-squared 0.212 0.212
Observations 52309 52309
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 13: Robustness: Net and aggregate productivity growth II (pooled)
No sorting Large shocks Small shocks
Net growth 0.006*** (0.002) 0.010*** (0.004) -0.218*** (0.079)
Aggregate growth -0.727*** (0.021) -0.753*** (0.036) -0.895*** (0.080)
Inability 0.015*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.004) 0.015*** (0.005)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Net growth*Inability -0.001 (0.001) 0.024** (0.011)
Aggr growth*Inability -0.002 (0.003) 0.018* (0.011)
Male 0.018*** (0.004) 0.009 (0.005) 0.023*** (0.007)
Age -0.298*** (0.013) -0.305*** (0.019) -0.291*** (0.017)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
Experience 0.014*** (0.001) 0.017*** (0.001) 0.012*** (0.001)
African-American -0.005 (0.005) 0.004 (0.007) -0.017** (0.008)
Hispanic -0.029*** (0.007) -0.006 (0.011) -0.054*** (0.010)
Foreign-born -0.053*** (0.006) -0.053*** (0.008) -0.049*** (0.009)
Married 0.003 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005) 0.003 (0.006)
Region: Midwest -0.008 (0.005) -0.008 (0.008) -0.008 (0.008)
Region: South 0.010* (0.005) 0.001 (0.007) 0.017** (0.007)
Region: West 0.028*** (0.006) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.030*** (0.009)
Bad health 0.077*** (0.002) 0.073*** (0.003) 0.079*** (0.003)
Year 1994 0.028*** (0.009) 0.018* (0.011) 0.035*** (0.013)
Year 1996 0.042*** (0.010) 0.021 (0.014) 0.056*** (0.018)
Year 1998 0.054*** (0.009) 0.035*** (0.012) 0.076*** (0.014)
Year 2000 0.092*** (0.010) 0.089*** (0.014) 0.100*** (0.014)
Year 2002 0.158*** (0.010) 0.137*** (0.014) 0.186*** (0.016)
Year 2004 0.203*** (0.009) 0.197*** (0.012) 0.225*** (0.015)
Year 2006 0.198*** (0.009) 0.187*** (0.013) 0.230*** (0.015)
Year 2008 0.182*** (0.010) 0.171*** (0.014) 0.213*** (0.018)
Year 2010 0.234*** (0.012) 0.220*** (0.018) 0.274*** (0.020)
Constant 7.633*** (0.372) 7.738*** (0.529) 7.478*** (0.494)
Adj.R-squared 0.212 0.195 0.229
Observations 52309 26474 25835
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 14: Robustness: Net and aggregate productivity growth I (panel)
No sorting Sorting
Net growth 0.007* (0.003) 0.011** (0.005)
Aggregate growth -0.397*** (0.028) -0.586*** (0.024)
Inability 0.002 (0.003) 0.011** (0.005)
Inability squared -0.000** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Net growth*Inability 0.001 (0.001)
Aggr growth*Inability -0.001 (0.003)
Experience 0.009*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001)
Male 0.032*** (0.008) 0.000 (0.008)
Age -0.238*** (0.013) -0.271*** (0.015)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.001 (0.007) 0.008 (0.009)
Hispanic 0.008 (0.008) -0.007 (0.011)
Foreign-born -0.038*** (0.007) -0.065*** (0.009)
Married 0.014** (0.007) 0.002 (0.006)
Region: Midwest 0.001 (0.007) 0.000 (0.009)
Region: South 0.007 (0.005) 0.025*** (0.008)
Region: West 0.016** (0.008) 0.044*** (0.010)
Bad health 0.019*** (0.002) 0.066*** (0.003)
Spouse working -0.048*** (0.006)
Wealth 0.000*** (0.000)
Pension 0.071*** (0.004)
Constant 6.104*** (0.350) 6.765*** (0.437)
R-squared-within 0.159 0.187
R-squared-between 0.202 0.224
R-squared-overall 0.144 0.184
Observations 40562 52309
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 15: Robustness: Net and aggregate productivity growth II (panel)
No sorting Large shocks Small shocks
Net growth 0.015*** (0.003) 0.019*** (0.006) -0.139** (0.057)
Aggregate growth -0.588*** (0.020) -0.581*** (0.037) -0.693*** (0.057)
Inability 0.010*** (0.003) 0.006 (0.005) 0.019** (0.008)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001 (0.000) -0.001** (0.000)
Net growth*Inability -0.000 (0.001) 0.008 (0.009)
Aggr growth*Inability 0.003 (0.004) 0.004 (0.008)
Experience 0.008*** (0.001) 0.008*** (0.001) 0.007*** (0.001)
Male 0.000 (0.008) -0.009 (0.009) 0.008 (0.013)
Age -0.271*** (0.015) -0.292*** (0.022) -0.261*** (0.015)
Age squared 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.008 (0.009) 0.019 (0.012) 0.001 (0.012)
Hispanic -0.006 (0.011) 0.017 (0.016) -0.024 (0.015)
Foreign-born -0.065*** (0.009) -0.074*** (0.011) -0.059*** (0.014)
Married 0.002 (0.006) 0.005 (0.009) -0.001 (0.008)
Region: Midwest 0.000 (0.009) -0.000 (0.011) 0.001 (0.012)
Region: South 0.025*** (0.008) 0.009 (0.010) 0.038*** (0.011)
Region: West 0.044*** (0.010) 0.037*** (0.013) 0.049*** (0.015)
Bad health 0.066*** (0.003) 0.065*** (0.004) 0.069*** (0.003)
Constant 6.766*** (0.439) 7.343*** (0.613) 6.448*** (0.423)
R-squared-within 0.187 0.192 0.187
R-squared-between 0.224 0.185 0.237
R-squared-overall 0.184 0.169 0.197
Observations 52309 26474 25835
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 16: Baseline: Probit vs. Linear probability model (pooled)
Probit Mrg Effects Linear Prob
Productivity growth -0.021* (0.013) -0.005* (0.003) -0.005 (0.003)
Inability 0.040*** (0.006) 0.010*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002)
Inability squared -0.003*** (0.001) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Growth*Inability 0.004* (0.002) 0.001* (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Experience -0.031*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000)
Male 0.019 (0.017) 0.005 (0.004) 0.013*** (0.004)
Age -0.790*** (0.052) -0.203*** (0.013) -0.280*** (0.014)
Age squared 0.008*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.013 (0.020) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.006)
Hispanic -0.105*** (0.028) -0.027*** (0.007) -0.031*** (0.007)
Foreign-born -0.208*** (0.026) -0.053*** (0.007) -0.055*** (0.006)
Married 0.028* (0.015) 0.007* (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
Region: Midwest -0.018 (0.022) -0.005 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005)
Region: South 0.039* (0.020) 0.010* (0.005) 0.011** (0.005)
Region: West 0.089*** (0.024) 0.023*** (0.006) 0.024*** (0.006)
Bad health 0.291*** (0.007) 0.075*** (0.002) 0.081*** (0.002)
Year 1994 0.111*** (0.037) 0.029*** (0.009) 0.025*** (0.009)
Year 1996 0.275*** (0.042) 0.071*** (0.011) 0.068*** (0.011)
Year 1998 0.184*** (0.039) 0.047*** (0.010) 0.043*** (0.009)
Year 2000 0.173*** (0.039) 0.045*** (0.010) 0.042*** (0.010)
Year 2002 0.345*** (0.039) 0.089*** (0.010) 0.089*** (0.010)
Year 2004 0.235*** (0.035) 0.060*** (0.009) 0.056*** (0.008)
Year 2006 0.204*** (0.039) 0.053*** (0.010) 0.052*** (0.009)
Year 2008 0.210*** (0.041) 0.054*** (0.011) 0.050*** (0.010)
Year 2010 0.250*** (0.048) 0.064*** (0.012) 0.060*** (0.013)
Constant 18.814*** (1.505) 7.420*** (0.394)
Adj.R-squared 0.171
Psd.R-squared 0.157
Observations 52310 52310 52310
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 17: Large and small shocks: Probit vs. Linear probability model (pooled)
Large shocks Small shocks
Probit Mrg Effects Linear Prob Probit Mrg Effects Linear Prob
Productivity growth 0.011** (0.004) 0.012*** (0.004) -0.273*** (0.089) -0.299*** (0.094)
Inability 0.020*** (0.003) 0.021*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Inability squared -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Growth*Inability -0.002*** (0.001) -0.003*** (0.001) 0.025** (0.011) 0.027** (0.012)
Experience -0.007*** (0.000) -0.008*** (0.000) -0.009*** (0.000) -0.010*** (0.000)
Male 0.006 (0.005) 0.012** (0.006) -0.000 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007)
Age -0.196*** (0.018) -0.277*** (0.020) -0.212*** (0.018) -0.285*** (0.018)
Age squared 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000)
African-American 0.018*** (0.007) 0.017** (0.007) -0.013* (0.007) -0.014* (0.008)
Hispanic -0.005 (0.010) -0.009 (0.011) -0.054*** (0.010) -0.056*** (0.010)
Foreign-born -0.054*** (0.009) -0.056*** (0.008) -0.051*** (0.010) -0.052*** (0.010)
Married 0.003 (0.005) 0.001 (0.005) 0.011* (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
Region: Midwest -0.002 (0.008) -0.002 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008) -0.011 (0.008)
Region: South 0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 0.018** (0.007) 0.019*** (0.007)
Region: West 0.021** (0.008) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.022** (0.009) 0.023*** (0.009)
Bad health 0.071*** (0.002) 0.078*** (0.003) 0.078*** (0.002) 0.084*** (0.003)
Year 1994 0.012 (0.013) 0.010 (0.011) 0.039** (0.016) 0.033** (0.014)
Year 1996 0.057*** (0.015) 0.055*** (0.015) 0.077*** (0.018) 0.075*** (0.018)
Year 1998 0.028** (0.014) 0.024* (0.013) 0.069*** (0.015) 0.068*** (0.014)
Year 2000 0.033** (0.014) 0.031** (0.014) 0.058*** (0.014) 0.056*** (0.013)
Year 2002 0.059*** (0.015) 0.058*** (0.016) 0.128*** (0.018) 0.134*** (0.020)
Year 2004 0.038*** (0.013) 0.036*** (0.012) 0.099*** (0.016) 0.097*** (0.016)
Year 2006 0.029** (0.014) 0.029** (0.013) 0.098*** (0.016) 0.102*** (0.016)
Year 2008 0.035** (0.015) 0.031** (0.014) 0.095*** (0.018) 0.098*** (0.019)
Year 2010 0.042** (0.017) 0.040** (0.018) 0.116*** (0.021) 0.116*** (0.023)
Constant 7.321*** (0.559) 7.585*** (0.523)
Adj.R-squared 0.149 0.196
Observations 27452 27452 24858 24858
* p ≤ 0.10, ** p ≤ 0.05, *** p ≤ 0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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